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Abstract
Distributed data sharing in dynamic networks is ubiquitous. It raises the concern that the private information of dynamic
networks could be leaked when data receivers are malicious or communication channels are insecure. In this paper, we propose
to intentionally perturb the inputs and outputs of a linear dynamic system to protect the privacy of target initial states and
inputs from released outputs. We formulate the problem of perturbation design as an optimization problem which minimizes
the cost caused by the added perturbations while maintaining system controllability and ensuring the privacy. We analyze the
computational complexity of the formulated optimization problem. To minimize the `0 and `2 norms of the added perturbations,
we derive their convex relaxations which can be efficiently solved. The efficacy of the proposed techniques is verified by a case
study on a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system.
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1 Introduction
Recently, information and communications technologies
are increasingly integrated with control systems in the
physical world. It has been stimulating the rapid emer-
gence of cyber-physical systems (CPS). CPS consists of
a large number of geographically dispersed entities and
thus distributed data sharing is necessary to achieve
network-wide goals. However, distributed data sharing
also raises the significant concern that the private or
confidential information of legitimate entities could be
leaked to malicious entities. Privacy has become an is-
sue of high priority to address before certain CPS can
be widely deployed. For example, the current absence
of accepted solutions to tackle privacy concerns caused
a deadlock in the mandatory deployment of smart
meters in the Netherlands because of the common be-
lief that smart metering is necessarily privacy-invasive
(Cavoukian, 2012). In 2010, California’s new law on
smart meter privacy indicated strong demands to pro-
tect the privacy of end-users’ energy consumption data
(California Public Utilities Commission, 2010).
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In the security community, several notions have been
used to define privacy. In particular, differentially pri-
vate schemes add random noises into each individual’s
data in such a way that, with high probability, the par-
ticipation of the individual cannot be inferred by an ad-
versary, who can access arbitrary auxiliary information,
via released data (Dwork and Roth, 2014). Mutual in-
formation (Sankar et al., 2013) requires explicit statis-
tical models of source data and auxiliary/side informa-
tion and quantifies average uncertainties about source
data conditioned on revealed data. Semantic security
(Goldwasser and Micali, 1984) requires that no addi-
tional information about a plaintext can be inferred us-
ing its ciphertext by any probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm. Perfect secrecy (Shannon, 1949) is stronger
than semantic security in that it assumes that the ad-
versary has unlimited computing power. Additionally, k-
anonymity (Samarati and Sweeney, 1998) protects iden-
tity privacy by requiring that each group of records that
share the same values for the quasi-identifiers (e.g., age,
gender, zip code) must include at least k records. The
notion of `-diversity (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007) ex-
tends k-anonymity to protect attribute privacy by re-
quiring that there is adequate diversity in each sensitive
attribute. The notion of t-closeness (Li et al., 2007) fur-
ther refines `-diversity by taking into account side infor-
mation of a priori distributions of the attributes.
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In the control and CPS communities, differential pri-
vacy has been adopted to Kalman filtering (Le Ny and
Pappas, 2014), consensus (Huang et al., 2012) and opti-
mization (Nozari et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2016); mutual
information has been used as a privacy metric in the ap-
plications of smart grid (Han et al., 2016) and stochastic
control systems (Venkitasubramaniam et al., 2015); se-
mantic security and perfect secrecy have been employed
in secure multiparty computation (Lu and Zhu, 2015)
and homomorphic encryption (Lu and Zhu, 2018).
Contributions. This paper considers a linear dynamic
network where a set of agents are physically coupled.
An external data requester requires the agents to release
system outputs in real time. The agents aim to prevent
the data requester from inferring initial states and past
inputs through the released outputs. We define that the
privacy is protected if the data requester has infinite
uncertainty on each of its target entries after observing
the released outputs. Our uncertainty-based privacy no-
tion extends `-diversity from the discrete-valued setting
to the continuous-valued setting. Please refer to Section
2.3 and the appendix for the justification of our privacy
definition. We propose a protection scheme where the
agents intentionally perturb the inputs and outputs such
that (i) privacy is protected; (ii) system controllability is
maintained; and (iii) the cost induced by the perturba-
tions is minimized. We investigate two cases of the cost
function:
(1) The sparsity of the perturbations is maximized, i.e.,
the `0 norm of the added perturbations is minimized.
(2) The utility of the released outputs is maximized, i.e.,
the `2 norm of the added perturbations is minimized.
We first analyze the computational complexity of the
formulated optimization problem. We then derive a
semidefinite program relaxation for the `0 norm mini-
mization by adopting the `1 norm heuristic, the nuclear
norm heuristic and a positive semidefinite condition.
For the `2 norm minimization, by using the tool of sin-
gular value decomposition, we provide a computation-
ally more efficient method which can return an analytic
feasible solution. Finally, the efficacy of the developed
techniques is verified by a case study on a heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system.
A preliminary version of this paper is presented in (Zhu
and Lu, 2015). Compared with (Zhu and Lu, 2015), in
the current paper, the privacy definition is refined; a
thorough analysis of computational complexity is pro-
vided; the relaxation for the `0 minimization problem is
developed; the `2 minimization is extended to allow for
general rank deficiency constraints; a case study on an
HVAC system is provided.
Notations and notions. For any k ∈ N, denote by
x[0,k] the sequence of {x0, · · · , xk}. The induced `1 norm,
`2 norm and Frobenius norm of matrix M are denoted
by ‖M‖1, ‖M‖2 and ‖M‖F , respectively. ‖M‖0 denotes
the number of nonzero entries of matrix M and is re-
ferred to as its `0 norm. ‖M‖∗ denotes the sum of the
singular values of matrix M and is referred to as its nu-
clear norm. For a column vector w ∈ Rn, define a quan-
tity | · |min as |w|min = min`∈{1,··· ,n} |w`|. Sn denotes the
set of real symmetric matrices of size n. Denote by M†
and M−1 the pseudo inverse and inverse of matrix M ,
respectively. The notation M = [Mij ] means that M is
a matrix for which the entry at the position of the i-th
row and the j-th column is Mij , or the ij-th block is
Mij if Mij itself is a matrix. For a vector x, x = [xi]
means that the i-th entry of x is xi. Tr(M), rank(M)
and det(M) denote the trace, the rank and the deter-
minant of matrix M , respectively. Given a matrix M ,
denote by vec(M) the column vector consisting of the
entries ofM . 0n is the column vector with n zeros. 0m×n
denotes the m× n matrix where all entries are zeros. In
denotes the identity matrix of size n. In computational
complexity, a polynomial-time algorithm is an algorithm
performing its task in a number of steps bounded by a
polynomial expression in the size of the problem input.
NP (nondeterministic polynomial time), one of the most
fundamental complexity classes, is the set of decision
problems where the “yes”-instances can be accepted in
polynomial time by a nondeterministic Turing machine.
A decision problem D is NP-hard if for every problem
D′ in NP, there is a polynomial-time reduction from D′
to D (Leeuwen, 1990).
2 Problem Statement
This section introduces the system model, the adversary
model and the privacy notion adopted in this paper.
2.1 Network model
Consider an interconnected dynamic network of V =
{1, · · · , N} where the physical dynamics of agent i are
described by the following linear discrete-time system:
xi(k + 1) = A¯iixi(k) +
∑
j∈Ni
A¯ijxj(k) + B¯iui(k)
y′i(k) = G¯
′
ixi(k) + H¯
′
iui(k). (1)
In (1), xi(k) ∈ Rni , ui(k) ∈ Rpi and y′i(k) ∈ Rli are
the state, input and output of agent i at time instant k,
respectively, and Ni ⊆ V \ {i} is the set of agents whose
states affect the state of agent i. The collection of states
and outputs in (1) can be compactly written as follows:
x(k + 1) = A¯x(k) + B¯u(k) (2)
y′(k) = G¯′x(k) + H¯ ′u(k) (3)
where x(k) = [xi(k)] ∈ Rn, u(k) = [ui(k)] ∈ Rp and
y′(k) = [y′i(k)] ∈ Rl, with n =
∑
i∈V ni, p =
∑
i∈V pi
and l =
∑
i∈V li. The matrices A¯, B¯, G¯
′ and H¯ ′ are
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system parameters known to the agents. In this paper,
we assume that each agent is allowed to communicate
with any other agent and measure all the entries of its
own state. The activation of a communication link or a
sensor induces certain cost.
2.2 Adversary model
There is an external data requester who requests a set
of linear combinations of the agents’ individual outputs.
Specifically, the data requester determines a constant
matrix Π ∈ Rq×l and tells its valuation to a data ag-
gregator. Each agent i measures its output y′i(k) and
sends it to the data aggregator, who then computes
y(k) = Πy′(k) and sends y(k) to the data requester.
Hence, the data received by the data requester is:
y(k) = Πy′(k) = G¯x(k) + H¯u(k) (4)
where G¯ = ΠG¯′ ∈ Rq×n and H¯ = ΠH¯ ′ ∈ Rq×p. The
agents are unaware of how the released data will be
used. In the rest of the paper, we use (A,B,G,H) to
represent arbitrary system matrices, while (A¯, B¯, G¯, H¯)
specifically represent system (2) and (4).
The data requester is assumed to be semi-honest 1 (Lin-
dell and Pinkas, 2009), and aims to exploit y(k) to in-
fer some entries of x(0) and {u(k)}. Our problem model
is motivated by several practical scenarios, e.g., smart
building and load monitoring in smart grid. For both
of these two applications, the physical dynamics can be
approximated by a linear dynamic model (Kang et al.,
2014; Maruta and Takarada, 2014). In smart building, a
system operator (data requester) uses temperature data
of individual rooms (agents) to monitor working com-
fortability and energy usage conditions. At the same
time, it may aim to infer occupancy data from room
temperature information, and by the occupancy data, it
might be able to derive the location traces of individual
occupants (Lisovich et al., 2010). In smart grid, a utility
company (data requester) collects power consumption
data stored at local smart meters of power consumers
(agents) to monitor power usage conditions. Meanwhile,
it may target to infer power load profiles of individual
consumers from aggregated home power consumption
information (McLaughlin et al., 2011).We assume that
the data requester is aware of the matrices A¯, B¯, G¯′ and
H¯ ′. This assumption models the auxiliary/side informa-
tion of the adversary. In this paper, we assume that all
the agents in V and the data aggregator are benign,
i.e., they will not use their observed information to infer
other agents’ private data.
1 Semi-honest adversaries correctly follow the algorithm
but attempt to use the received messages to infer pri-
vate/confidential information of legitimate entities.
2.3 Privacy notion
We next introduce the privacy notion adopted in this pa-
per. The data requester aims to infer the values of partial
(could be all) entries of the initial state x(0) and the in-
put sequence {u(k)}. We call those entries as target en-
tries. The remaining entries of x(0) and {u(k)} are called
nontarget entries. Denote by xt(0) and xn(0) (resp. ut
and un) the column vectors of the target and nontarget
entries of x(0) (resp. u), respectively. Denote by dtx, d
t
u,
dnx and d
n
u the dimensions of x
t(0), ut, xn(0) and un, re-
spectively. It holds that dtx + d
n
x = n and d
t
u + d
n
u = p.
Denote by xt`(0) (resp. u
t
`, x
n
` (0) and u
n
` ) the `-th entry
of xt(0) (resp. ut, xn(0) and un). For a target entry ut`,
we consider that it is protected if and only if ut`(k) is pro-
tected for any k ∈ N. In other words, if the value of ut`(k)
for one time instant k is disclosed to the data requester,
then we consider that the privacy of ut` is compromised.
Given system matrices (A,B,G,H), for each time in-
stant k, the output y(k) can be expressed as a linear
combination of the entries of x(0) and u[0,k]:
y(k) = GAkx(0) +
k−1∑
m=0
GAk−1−mBu(m) +Hu(k). (5)
Given system matrices (A,B,G,H) and time instant
κ ∈ N, for any feasible output sequence y[0,κ], we define
a set ∆A,B,G,H(y[0,κ]) as:
∆A,B,G,H(y[0,κ]) = {xt(0), ut[0,κ] : ∃xn(0), un[0,κ],
s.t. y(k) = right-hand-side of (5),∀k = 0, · · · , κ,
with x(0) the composition of xt(0) and xn(0) and u(k)
the composition of ut(k) and un(k),∀k = 0, · · · , κ}.
The set ∆A,B,G,H(y[0,κ]) includes all possible valuations
of {xt(0), ut[0,κ]} that can generate y[0,κ] in (5). We define
the diameter of ∆A,B,G,H(y[0,κ]) as:
DiamA,B,G,H(y[0,κ]) = sup
w,w′∈∆A,B,G,H(y[0,κ])
|w − w′|min.
Definition 2.1 Given system matrices (A,B,G,H),
the privacy of xt(0) and ut is said to be protected if, for
any κ ∈ N, DiamA,B,G,H(y[0,κ]) = ∞ for any feasible
output sequence y[0,κ]. •
We next justify Definition 2.1 through comparisons with
several popular existing notions in our problem setting.
• Why not semantic security or perfect secrecy? These
notions require that “nothing is learned” by the adver-
sary from outputs. However, as pointed out in Section
2.2 of (Dwork and Roth, 2014), such “nothing is learned”
definition cannot be adopted to applications in which
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the outputs have to be used to realize certain utility by
the data user who is adversary, because such a strong
privacy requirement intrinsically inhibits any meaning-
ful data utility. In our problem, the adversary and the
data user is the same entity, i.e., the data requester, and
it has to accomplish certain analysis using the outputs.
•Why not mutual information metric? The usage of mu-
tual information metric requires explicit statistical mod-
els of source data and auxiliary/side information (Sankar
et al., 2013). This requirement might be restrictive or
even unrealistic for our problem as the inputs of the sys-
tem may not follow any probabilistic distribution.
• Why not differential privacy? To achieve differential
privacy, noises are persistently added to the released
data via following, e.g., Gaussian and Laplace distribu-
tions. For control systems, such open-loop and persistent
noise injection mechanisms could potentially deteriorate
system performance.
• Our uncertainty-based privacy notion Definition 2.1.
Definition 2.1 is extended from the notion of `-diversity.
In particular, `-diversity has been widely used in both
application-centric research (Kumar and Karthikeyan,
2012; Li and Das, 2013) and formal privacy analysis
(Last et al., 2014; Li et al., 2007) on attribute privacy of
discrete-valued tabular datasets. Besides academic stud-
ies, k-anonymity and `-diversity have also been popular
in real world applications. As mentioned in page 16 of
(Malle et al., 2017), k-anonymity has become a standard
privacy notion in the industry. For example, the pass-
word manager 1Password has applied k-anonymity to
protect the privacy of the customers’ passwords (Brod-
kin, 2018). Recently, Google released a data loss pre-
vention application programming interface (API) which
supported k-anonymity and `-diversity (Hopping, 2017).
Informally speaking, possessing `-diversity means that
there are at least ` different values for each sensitive at-
tribute of the dataset in the released table. A larger di-
versity indicates a larger uncertainty and thus the no-
tion of diversity can be viewed as a measure of uncer-
tainty. To make an analogy to `-diversity, in our prob-
lem, we can view each entry of xt(0) and ut as a sensitive
attribute and require adequate diversity/uncertainty on
it. In `-diversity, the diversity of discrete-valued sensi-
tive attributes is defined by the number of different val-
uations for the attributes. In contrast, the target entries
xt(0) and ut in our problem are continuous-valued and
uncountable, which requires a new measure to quantify
the diversity/uncertainty. In this paper, given system
matrices (A,B,G,H), the diversity/uncertainty is mea-
sured by the diameter of the set ∆A,B,G,H(y[0,κ]). Hence,
Definition 2.1 extends the notion of `-diversity from the
discrete-valued setting to the continuous-valued setting.
A detailed introduction to `-diversity and extension to
Definition 2.1 in our problem setting is given in the ap-
pendix.
Definition 2.1 is closely relevant to non-strong observ-
ability (Hautus, 1983) in control theory. Specifically, a
dynamic system is not strongly observable if at least one
entry of the initial states and input sequence is unob-
servable, i.e., cannot be uniquely determined. However,
non-strong observability does not necessarily imply that
all the target entries are unobservable. Definition 2.1
extends non-strong observability by explicitly ensuring
such property. Using the language of control theory, Def-
inition 2.1 can be equivalently stated as follows: Given
system matrices (A,B,G,H), the privacy of the target
entries is said to be protected if no target entry is in
the strongly observable subspace of system (A,B,G,H).
This uncertainty/unobservability-based privacy defini-
tion has been widely adopted in the control community;
please see, e.g., (Mo and Murray, 2017) and (Pequito
et al., 2014), in which the initial state of a system is pri-
vate if it is not in the observable subspace.
In discrete event systems, the notion of opacity has been
widely used to define system state privacy (Wu and
Lafortune, 2014; Ramasubramanian et al., 2016; Ji et al.,
2018). A system is opaque if for every secret-induced be-
havior, there exists a non-secret-induced behavior that
generates identical observations. The notion of opacity is
similar to our privacy notion in spirit. However, the pri-
vacy objectives are different. In opacity-based works, the
privacy objective is to ensure that the adversary cannot
determine from the observations whether or not the sys-
tem state belongs to a predefined secret set. In contrast,
Definition 2.1 aims to protect data privacy such that for
any valuation of any target entry, the adversary has in-
finite uncertainty from the observations on the value of
the target entry.
Advantages. Compared with semantic security and per-
fect secrecy, our notion is weaker than the “nothing is
learned” requirement and allows for meaningful data
utility. Compared with mutual information, our notion
does not require any statistical model for system states,
inputs and outputs. Compared with differential privacy,
our notion does not require using persistent perturba-
tions. Please refer to Remark 3.1 for more discussions.
Limitation. A limitation of our privacy notion is that
it does not take into account the scenario where the
data requester has auxiliary information of some a pri-
ori skewed distribution of x(0) and {u(k)}. Note that `-
diversity is also vulnerable to skewness attacks (Li et al.,
2007). For this case, instead of requiring infinite uncer-
tainty on the target data items, the privacy goal should
be that the posterior uncertainties after seeing the ob-
servations should be as close as possible to the a priori
uncertainties determined by the a priori skewed distri-
bution. This privacy goal extends t-closeness (Li et al.,
2007), which is a refinement of `-diversity, from discrete-
valued settings to continuous-valued settings. We leave
the study of the refined privacy goal as a future work.
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2.4 Privacy preserving data release
To protect privacy, we propose to perturb the inputs and
outputs such that the data requester cannot infer the
target entries in the sense of Definition 2.1. However, the
perturbations should maintain certain system utilities,
e.g., controllability. Throughout this paper, we assume
that the original system (A¯, B¯) is controllable and aim to
maintain controllability of the perturbed system. These
partially conflicting sub-objectives define the problem
of privacy preserving data release. In the remainder of
the paper, we introduce our solutions of this problem.
First, in Section 3, we introduce our perturbation mech-
anism and the optimization formulation to solve for the
optimal perturbation. In particular, we formulate an `0
optimization that studies economy-privacy tradeoff and
an `2 optimization that studies utility-privacy tradeoff.
After that, we show that the formulated optimization
problems are hard to solve. In Section 4, we first pro-
vide a further computational complexity result for the
`0 optimization problem and then derive a convex relax-
ation for it. A convex relaxation for the `2 optimization
problem is derived in Section 5.
3 Intentional input-output perturbations
In this section, we first introduce a class of optimization
problems to formulate intentional input-output pertur-
bations. After that, we analyze the computational com-
plexity of the formulated optimization problem.
3.1 Optimization formulation
To protect privacy, we propose the approach of inten-
tional input-output perturbations. Each agent i inten-
tionally perturbs its own input ui(k) and output y
′
i(k)
by adding signals µµi (k) ∈ Rpi and µyi (k) ∈ Rli , re-
spectively. The perturbations µui (k) and µ
y
i (k) are linear
combinations of system states and inputs and given by:
µui (k) =
∑
j∈V K
SS
ij xj(k) +
∑
j∈V K
SI
ij uj(k)
µyi (k) =
∑
j∈V K
OS
ij xj(k) +
∑
j∈V K
OI
ij uj(k). (6)
The superscript SI means a perturbation from an input
to a state. Other superscripts are defined analogously,
with O denoting output. Substituting the perturbations
µu(k) = [µui (k)] and µ
y(k) = [µyi (k)] into (2) and (4)
renders the following perturbed system:
x(k + 1) = A¯x(k) + B¯(u(k) + µu(k))
= Aˆx(k) + Bˆu(k) (7)
y(k) = Π(G¯′x(k) + H¯ ′(u(k) + µu(k)) + µy(k))
= Gˆx(k) + Hˆu(k) (8)
where Aˆ = A¯ + B¯KSS , Bˆ = B¯(Ip + KSI), Gˆ = G¯ +
H¯KSS + ΠKOS and Hˆ = H¯ + H¯KSI + ΠKOI , with
KSS = [K
SS
ij ] ∈ Rp×n, KSI = [KSIij ] ∈ Rp×p, KOS =
[KOSij ] ∈ Rl×n and KOI = [KOIij ] ∈ Rl×p. Let K =[
KSS KSI
KOS KOI
]
∈ R(p+l)×(n+p). In the rest of the paper,
we use (Aˆ, Bˆ, Gˆ, Hˆ) to specifically represent the per-
turbed system (7) and (8). The perturbation matrix K
is subject to two constraints:
(i) The perturbed system (Aˆ, Bˆ) remains controllable.
(ii) The data requester cannot infer the target entries in
the sense of Definition 2.1 from the outputs (8).
By adding µu to u according to (6), the perturbed input
uˆ is uˆ = u+µu = KSSx+ (Ip+KSI)u and this actually
changes system matrices (A¯, B¯) to (Aˆ, Bˆ). The control-
lability of (A¯, B¯) does not guarantee that of (Aˆ, Bˆ).
Denote by C(KSS ,KSI) the controllability matrix of
the perturbed system, i.e.,
C(KSS ,KSI) = [Bˆ, AˆBˆ, · · · , Aˆn−1Bˆ]
= [B¯(Ip +KSI), (A¯+ B¯KSS)B¯(Ip +KSI),
· · · , (A¯+ B¯KSS)n−1B¯(Ip +KSI)].
The perturbed system is controllable if and only if
det(C(KSS ,KSI)(C(KSS ,KSI))T ) > 0. Meanwhile, the
agents aim to minimize the cost induced by the pertur-
bations. This is captured by minimizing an objective
function c(K) determined later. All the above objectives
are encoded in the following optimization problem:
minK∈R(p+l)×(n+p) c(K)
s.t.DiamAˆ,Bˆ,Gˆ,Hˆ(y[0,κ]) =∞,∀κ ∈ N and feasible y[0,κ],
det(C(KSS ,KSI)(C(KSS ,KSI))T ) > 0. (9)
In this paper, we study the following two representative
cases of the cost function.
Problem P0: economy–privacy tradeoff. The added per-
turbations require communication and sensing. If one
entry of KSSji or K
OS
ji is nonzero, then agent i needs to
measure the corresponding entry of xi and sends it to
agent j. If one entry of of KSIji or K
OI
ji is nonzero, then
agent i needs to share its control ui with agent j. Recall
that activation of communication links and sensors in-
duces some cost. Minimizing such cost can be encoded
into maximizing the sparsity of the perturbation matrix
K and equivalently minimizing the `0 norm of K, i.e.,
c(K) = ‖K‖0 in problem (9). This is referred to as the
`0 minimization and denoted by P0.
Problem P2: utility–privacy tradeoff. The goal of the
data requester is to collect the true output. In this pa-
per setup, the true output y(k) is the linear combi-
nation of x(k) and u(k) weighted by the original out-
put matrices (G¯, H¯), i.e., G¯x(k) + H¯u(k). The differ-
ence between the released output y(k) of (8) and the
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true output G¯x(k) + H¯u(k) is data disutility. Notice
that the perturbation added into the state equation (2)
does not change the linear combination and thus does
not affect data disutility. Instead, these perturbations
can protect the privacy of target entries. We rewrite
(8) as y(k) = G¯x(k) + H¯u(k) + [H¯,Π]K[x(k)T , u(k)T ]T
and define data disutility as
∥∥[H¯,Π]K[x(k)T , u(k)T ]T∥∥
2
.
Notice that
∥∥[H¯,Π]K[x(k)T , u(k)T ]T∥∥
2
≤ ∥∥[H¯,Π]K∥∥
2∥∥[x(k)T , u(k)T ]T∥∥
2
, and x(k) and u(k) are not decision
variables. Hence, we turn to minimize
∥∥[H¯,Π]K∥∥
2
, i.e.,
c(K) =
∥∥[H¯,Π]K∥∥
2
in problem (9). This is referred to
as the `2 minimization and denoted by P2.
We assume that the optimal perturbation matrix K,
i.e., the solution of problem (9), is known to the data
requester. This is another piece of auxiliary information
available to the data requester.
Remark 3.1 Similar to differential privacy, our tech-
nique also adopts perturbations for privacy preservation.
However, by (6), it can be seen that the perturbations
are added in a closed-loop fashion and diminishing as the
system is stabilized. Since we formulate problem (9) such
that the perturbed system remains controllable, one can
design a feedback controller by the perturbed system ma-
trices (A¯ + B¯KSS , B¯(Ip + KSI)) to achieve perfect sta-
bility where the perturbations vanish at the equilibrium.
Data privacy has a fundamental utility-privacy trade-
off: disclosing fully accurate information maximizes data
utility but minimizes data privacy, while disclosing ran-
dom noises achieves the opposite (Li and Li, 2009). Our
optimization formulation (9) utilizes control theory to
characterize the tradeoff. This allows us to take into
account dynamic system utilities, e.g., controllability,
which have not been addressed in the literature. •
3.2 Relaxation of problem (9)
The first constraint of (9) has a clear privacy interpreta-
tion, but is not analytically tractable. In this subsection,
we identify a relation between the privacy constraint and
the rank deficiency of a matrix pencil, which allows us
to relax the privacy constraint by a rank constraint.
Given a linear system (A,B,G,H), for any z ∈ C, define
matrix pencil
DA,B,G,H(z) =
[
zIn −A −B
G H
]
.
For any v ∈ Rn+p, we write v = [vT1 , vT2 ]T with v1 ∈ Rn
and v2 ∈ Rp. Let vt1 (resp. vt2) be the sub-vector of v1
(resp. v2) corresponding to x
t(0) (resp. ut), i.e., if the
`-th entry of x(0) (resp. u) is an entry of xt(0) (resp.
ut), then the `-th entry of v1 (resp. v2) is an entry of v
t
1
(resp. vt2). The dimensions of v
t
1 and v
t
2 are then d
t
x and
dtu, respectively. Denote by v
t
1` (resp. v
t
2`) the `-th entry
of vt1 (resp. v
t
2).
The following lemma provides a sufficient condition for
privacy protection. Its proof leverages properties of the
matrix pencil defined above, and closely follows and ex-
tends the rank-based characterizations of strong observ-
ability (Hautus, 1983; Kratz, 1995).
Lemma 3.1 Given a linear system (A,B,G,H), the
privacy of xt(0) and ut is protected if there exists
a pair of z ∈ C and v ∈ Rn+p\{0n+p} satisfying
DA,B,G,H(z)v = 0n+q such that the following two con-
ditions are satisfied simultaneously:
(1) if dtx 6= 0, then vt1` 6= 0 for all ` ∈ {1, · · · , dtx};
(2) if dtu 6= 0, then z 6= 0 and vt2` 6= 0 for all
` ∈ {1, · · · , dtu}. •
Proof: Given that DA,B,G,H(z)v = 0n+q, we have
Av1 + Bv2 = zv1 and Gv1 + Hv2 = 0q. Fix any κ ∈ N
and any feasible output sequence y[0,κ]. Denote by x(0)
′
and u[0,κ]
′ an arbitrary set of initial states and input se-
quence that satisfy y[0,κ], i.e., x(k+1)
′ = Ax(k)′+Bu(k)′
and y(k) = Gx(k)′ + Hu(k)′ for any k ∈ {0, · · · , κ}.
We then have {xt(0)′, ut[0,κ]′} ∈ ∆A,B,G,H(y[0,κ]). De-
note x(0)′′ = x(0)′ + mv1 and u(k)′′ = u(k)′ + mzkv2
for each k ∈ {0, · · · , κ}, where m is an arbitrary
scalar. We next show by mathematical induction that,
with the initial state x(0)′′ and input sequence u[0,κ]′′,
x(k)′′ = x(k)′ + mzkv1 for any k ∈ {0, · · · , κ}. For
k = 0, we have x(0)′′ = x(0)′ + mv1 = x(0)′ + mz0v1.
For k = 1, we have
x(1)′′ = Ax(0)′′ +Bu(0)′′
= A(x(0)′ +mv1) +B(u(0)′ +mv2)
= Ax(0)′ + Bu(0)′ + m(Av1 + Bv2) = x(1)′ + mzv1.
Assume that x(k)′′ = x(k)′ +mzkv1. Then, we have
x(k + 1)′′ = Ax(k)′′ +Bu(k)′′
= A(x(k)′ +mzkv1) +B(u(k)′ +mzkv2)
= Ax(k)′ +Bu(k)′ +mzk(Av1 +Bv2)
= x(k + 1)′ +mzk+1v1.
We then have x(k)′′ = x(k)′ + mzkv1 for any
k ∈ {0, · · · , κ}. Hence, for any k ∈ {0, · · · , κ}, we have
Gx(k)′′ +Hu(k)′′
= G(x(k)′ +mzkv1) +H(u(k)′ +mzkv2)
= Gx(k)′ +Hu(k)′ +mzk(Gv1 +Hv2)
= Gx(k)′ +Hu(k)′ = y(k).
This implies {xt(0)′′, ut[0,κ]′′} ∈ ∆A,B,G,H(y[0,κ]). Note
min`∈{1,··· ,dtx} |xt`(0)′ − xt`(0)′′| = min`∈{1,··· ,dtx} |mvt1`|,
min `∈{1,··· ,dtu}
k∈{0,··· ,κ}
|ut`(k)′−ut`(k)′′| = min `∈{1,··· ,dtu}
k∈{0,··· ,κ}
|mzkvt2`|.
If vt1` 6= 0 ∀` ∈ {1, · · · , dtx} and vt2` 6= 0 ∀` ∈ {1, · · · , dtu}
and z 6= 0, then
DiamA,B,G,H(y[0,κ]) ≥
sup
m∈R
min{ min
`∈{1,··· ,dtx}
|mvt1`|, min
`∈{1,··· ,dtu}
k∈{0,··· ,κ}
|mzkvt2`|} = ∞.
The above analysis holds for any κ ∈ N and any feasible
y[0,κ]. By Definition 2.1, x
t(0) and ut are protected. •
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Lemma 3.1 requires that the matrix pencil DA,B,G,H(z)
does not have full column rank. Intuitively, one can pro-
tect more entries of x(0) and u by reducing the rank of
DA,B,G,H(z). This is verified by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2 Given (A,B,G,H), if there exists z 6= 0
such that DA,B,G,H(z) has column rank r, then at least
n+ p− r entries of x(0) and u can be protected. •
Proof: If DA,B,G,H(z) has column rank r, then the null
space of DA,B,G,H(z) has rank n + p − r. This implies
that DA,B,G,H(z) must have a null vector v with at least
n+p−r non-zero entries. By Lemma 3.1, at least n+p−r
entries of x(0) and u are protected. •
For convenience of notation, in the rest of the paper,
let D¯(z) = DA¯,B¯,G¯,H¯(z) and Dˆ(z) = DAˆ,Bˆ,Gˆ,Hˆ(z),
i.e., D¯(z) and Dˆ(z) are the matrix pencils of the
original system (A¯, B¯, G¯, H¯) and the perturbed sys-
tem (Aˆ, Bˆ, Gˆ, Hˆ), respectively. It can be checked that
Dˆ(z) = D¯(z) +FK with F =
[
−B¯ 0n×l
H¯ Π
]
. Lemma 3.2
states that one can protect more entries of x(0) and u
by reducing the rank of Dˆ(z). With more entries of x(0)
and u being protected, in general, it is more likely that
more entries of xt(0) and ut can be protected. By this
observation, we relax problem (9) as follows:
minK∈R(p+l)×(n+p),z∈C c(K)
s.t. rank(D¯(z) + FK) < ρ,
det(C(KSS ,KSI)(C(KSS ,KSI))T ) > 0 (10)
where ρ ∈ [1,min{n+ p, n+ q}] is a constant integer. In
the remaining, we use P˜0 (resp. P˜2) to denote problem
(10) with c(K) = ‖K‖0 (resp. c(K) =
∥∥[H¯,Π]K∥∥
2
).
Given any integer ρ between [1,min{n + p, n + q}], by
Lemma 3.2, the optimal solution of problem (10) can
guarantee that at least n+ p− ρ+ 1 entries of x(0) and
u can be protected in the perturbed system. However,
Lemma 3.2 does not indicate which entries of x(0) and u
can be protected. We will provide a scheme to perform
the verification in the next paragraph. If some entries of
xt(0) and ut are not protected, we decrease the value of
ρ and re-solve problem (10). Our objective is to protect
all the entries of xt(0) and ut with the largest possible ρ
(so that with the smallest possible perturbation).
We next illustrate a mechanism for checking which en-
tries can be protected in the perturbed system after solv-
ing problem (10) under a given ρ. Given the system ma-
trices (A¯, B¯, G¯, H¯) of the original system and an optimal
solution (K, z) of problem (10), one can derive the null
space of D¯(z)+FK and then make use of Lemma 3.1 to
check which entries can be protected in the perturbed
system. In particular, if the null space of D¯(z)+FK ad-
mits a null vector v = [vT1 , v
T
2 ]
T such that vt1` 6= 0, then
the `-th entry of xt(0) is protected. If z 6= 0 and the null
space of D¯(z) + FK admits a null vector v such that
vt2` 6= 0, then the `-th entry of ut is protected.
The remaining issue is how to solve problem (10) under
a given ρ. The next theorem shows the non-convexity of
the constraint set of problem (10), indicating that the
problem could be hard to solve and needs to be fur-
ther relaxed. In the next section, we furhter prove a NP-
hardness result for problem P˜0.
Theorem 3.1 The constraint set of problem (10) is non-
convex. •
Proof: Denote the constraint set of (10) by Υ. Let
(z′,K ′) ∈ Υ be any feasible quadruple. The feasibil-
ity implies that C(K ′SS ,K ′SI) has full row rank and
rank(D¯(z′)+FK ′) < ρ. Consider (K ′′SS ,K
′′
SI ,K
′′
OS ,K
′′
OI)
= (K ′SS ,−K ′SI − 2Ip,K ′OS ,−K ′OI). ThenC(K ′′SS ,K ′′SI) = C(K ′SS ,−K ′SI − 2Ip)
= [B¯(Ip −K ′SI − 2Ip), (A¯+ B¯K ′SS)B¯(Ip −K ′SI − 2Ip),
· · · , (A¯+ B¯K ′SS)n−1B¯(Ip −K ′SI − 2Ip)]
= −C(K ′SS ,K ′SI)
which has full row rank. Thus, (K ′′SS , K
′′
SI) satisfies the
controllability constraint. Take z′′ = z′. We have
D¯(z′′) + FK ′′
=
[
z′′In − (A¯+ B¯K ′′SS) −B¯(Ip +K ′′SI)
G¯+ H¯K ′′SS + ΠK
′′
OS H¯ + H¯K
′′
SI + ΠK
′′
OI
]
=
[
z′In − (A¯+ B¯K ′SS) B¯(Ip +K ′SI)
G¯+ H¯K ′SS + ΠK
′
OS −(H¯ + H¯K ′SI + ΠK ′OI)
]
which implies rank(D¯(z′′) + FK ′′) = rank(D¯(z′) +
FK ′) < ρ. Thus, (z′′,K ′′) ∈ Υ.
Now consider another quadruple (K◦SS ,K
◦
SI ,K
◦
OS ,K
◦
OI)
= (K ′SS ,−Ip,K ′OS ,0l×p). Notice that (K◦SS ,K◦SI ,K◦OS ,
K◦OI) = (K
′
SS ,−Ip,K ′OS ,0l×p) = 12 (K ′SS ,K ′SI ,K ′OS ,
K ′OI) +
1
2 (K
′′
SS ,K
′′
SI ,K
′′
OS ,K
′′
OI), which implies that
(K◦SS ,K
◦
SI ,K
◦
OS ,K
◦
OI) is a convex combination of
(K ′SS ,K
′
SI ,K
′
OS ,K
′
OI) and (K
′′
SS ,K
′′
SI , K
′′
OS ,K
′′
OI).
Let z◦ = z′. Then (z◦,K◦) is a convex combination of
(z′,K ′) and (z′′,K ′′). We have
C(K◦SS ,K◦SI) = C(K ′SS ,−Ip)
= [B¯(Ip − Ip), (A¯+ B¯K ′SS)B¯(Ip − Ip), · · · ,
(A¯+ B¯K ′SS)
n−1B¯(Ip − Ip)] = 0n×np,
which does not have full row rank. Thus, (K◦SS ,K
◦
SI)
does not satisfy the controllability constraint and hence
(z◦,K◦) /∈ Υ. This implies that Υ is non-convex. •
4 Problem P˜0
In this section, we first prove that a relaxation of prob-
lem P˜0 is NP-hard, which indicates that problem P˜0 it-
self might also be NP-hard. We then provide a convex
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approximation for problem P˜0. Specifically, in problem
(10), the `0 norm in the objective function is relaxed by
the `1 norm heuristic, the rank constraint is relaxed by
the nuclear norm heuristic, and the controllability con-
straint is approximated by a symmetric positive semidef-
inite condition.
4.1 Computational intractability
To obtain a rigorous NP-hardness result, we consider
the following problem derived by fixing some z and
[KSS ,KSI ] = 0p×(n+p), and dropping the controllabil-
ity constraint of problem P˜0:
minKO∈Rl×(n+p) ‖KO‖0
s.t. rank(D¯(z) + F
[
0p×(n+p)
KO
]
) < ρ. (11)
whereKO = [KOS ,KOI ]. Denote problem (11) by Pˆ0(z).
By fixing z and [KSS ,KSI ], the dimension of the decision
variables is reduced. By the proof of Theorem 3.1, the
controllability constraint of problem P˜0 is non-convex.
Hence, intuitively, problem P˜0 might be harder to solve
than problem Pˆ0(z). We next show that problem Pˆ0(z) is
NP-hard due to the non-convexity of its objective func-
tion. This provides an implication that problem P˜0 might
also be NP-hard. We leave the proof of NP-hardness of
problem P˜0 to our future works.
It is well-known that `0 norm is non-convex and `0 norm
optimization problems are hard to solve in general. How-
ever, there has been a limited number of `0 norm op-
timization problems which have been rigorously proven
to be NP-hard. The following theorem establishes the
NP-hardness of problem Pˆ0(z) by showing that it is as
hard as finding a sparsest null vector of a matrix with
more columns than rows, which has been proven to be
NP-hard (Coleman and Pothen, 1986).
Theorem 4.1 Problem Pˆ0(z) is NP-hard. •
Proof: We prove the NP-hardness of problem Pˆ0(z)
by following the standard procedure of proving NP-
hardness (Leeuwen, 1990):
Step 1. Reduce any instance of a known NP-hard prob-
lem to an instance of problem Pˆ0(z) in polynomial time;
Step 2. Show that a solution of the instance of the known
NP-hard problem can be constructed from a solution of
the instance of problem Pˆ0(z) in polynomial time.
The known NP-hard problem we use is the following null
vector problem (NVP) (Coleman and Pothen, 1986):
Null vector problem: Given a matrix M ∈ Rr×c with
r < c, find a sparest null vector ofM , i.e., find an optimal
solution v∗ to the following optimization problem
minv∈Rc\{0c} ‖v‖0 s.t. Mv = 0r. (12)
Step 1. Consider a matrix M ∈ Rr×c with r < c. Let
M = [M1,M2] with M1 ∈ Rr×r and M2 ∈ Rr×(c−r).
Given M , we construct an instance of Pˆ0(z) as follows:
let n = r, p = c − r, l = q = c, z be any fixed complex
number, A¯ = zIn−M1, B¯ = −M2, [G¯′, H¯ ′] = Π = In+p,
and ρ = n+ p. With the above defined parameters, the
instance of problem Pˆ0(z) can be written as:
min
KO∈Rc×c
‖KO‖0 s.t. rank([MT , (Ic +KO)T ]T ) < c. (13)
It is clear that the construction of problem (13) can be
done in polynomial time.
Step 2. Let K∗O be an optimal solution of problem (13)
and v∗ be an optimal solution of problem (12).
Claim I: ‖K∗O‖0 = ‖v∗‖0.
Proof of Claim I: Let KO be any feasible solution of
problem (13). Notice that rank([MT , (Ic+KO)
T ]T ) < c
if and only if there exists v ∈ Rc\{0c} such thatMv = 0r
and KOv = −v. For any such vector v, for any i ∈
{1, · · · , c}, if vi 6= 0, then, to satisfy KOv = −v, the
entries of the i-th row of KO cannot be all zero. This
implies ‖KO‖0 ≥ ‖v‖0. In particular, since v is a null
vector of M , we have ‖KO‖0 ≥ ‖v∗‖0. Since this is true
for any feasible KO, we have ‖K∗O‖0 ≥ ‖v∗‖0. Next, by
the following procedure, we construct a matrix K˜O that
is feasible to problem (13) and ‖K˜O‖0 = ‖v∗‖0.
Procedure I : For each i ∈ {1, · · · , c}, if v∗i = 0, then
(K˜O)ij = 0 for all j ∈ {1, · · · , c}; if v∗i 6= 0, then
(K˜O)ii = −1 and (K˜O)ij = 0 for all j ∈ {1, · · · , c}\{i}.
By Procedure I, it is easy to derive K˜Ov
∗ = −v∗ and
‖K˜O‖0 = ‖v∗‖0. Since v∗ is a null vector of M , we have
Mv∗ = 0r. By optimality, we have ‖K∗O‖0 ≤ ‖K˜O‖0 =‖v∗‖0. Hence, together with the above result ‖K∗O‖0 ≥‖v∗‖0, we have ‖K∗O‖0 = ‖v∗‖0. •
We next complete Step 2 by showing that an optimal
solution v∗ of problem (12) can be constructed in poly-
nomial time from an optimal solution K∗O of problem
(13). Let η = ‖K∗O‖0. Notice that η is a known constant.
We next show that with η, one can derive an optimal
solution v∗ of problem (12) in polynomial time.
By Claim I, we have ‖v∗‖0 = η, i.e., a sparest null vec-
tor of M has η non-zero entries. To find a sparest null
vector of M , we consider the sub-matrices composed
of any collection of η columns of M . There are totally
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(
c
η
)
= (c−η+1)·····cη! collections of η columns, which is a
polynomial of c. For each sub-matrix Mη of η columns,
we solve Mηv = 0r to obtain the general form of solu-
tion of v, which can be done in polynomial time by the
Gaussian elimination method (page 12 of (Farebrother,
1988)). If the general form of solution only admits 0η,
then go on with the next sub-matrix; if the the gen-
eral form of solution admits a vector with at least one
non-zero entry, stop. Denote the matrix at the last step
by M∗η . Pick any non-zero vector from the general form
of solution to M∗η v = 0r, and denote it by v¯
∗. Since
v¯∗ ∈ Rη\{0η}, we have 0 < ‖v¯∗‖0 ≤ η. We then aug-
ment v¯∗ to a vector vˆ∗ ∈ Rc by filling in zeros to the po-
sitions corresponding to the columns of M that are not
in M∗η . It is clear that Mvˆ
∗ = 0r and ‖vˆ∗‖0 = ‖v¯∗‖0.
Hence, vˆ∗ is a null vector of M such that 0 < ‖vˆ∗‖0 ≤ η.
Since a sparsest null vector of M has η non-zero entries,
it must hold ‖vˆ∗‖0 ≥ η. Then ‖vˆ∗‖0 = η. Hence, we have
derived an optimal solution of problem (12). Since the
total number of sub-matrices is a polynomial of c and
for each sub-matrix, it takes polynomial time to do the
computation, we have constructed a solution to the NVP
from a solution of problem Pˆ0(z) in polynomial time. •
4.2 Convex relaxations
The `0 norm ‖ · ‖0 in problem (10) introduces non-
convexity. In compressed sensing (Candes and Tao, 2005;
Donoho, 2006), it is a common practice to replace ‖ · ‖0
by ‖ · ‖1. It is proven that the `1 norm heuristic re-
turns the sparsest solution under certain conditions, e.g.,
restricted isometry property (RIP) (Candes and Tao,
2005). Through experiments, one can see that the `1
norm heuristic can return sparse solutions even RIP is
not valid (Yang and Zhang, 2011). Recall that vec(K)
is the column vector consisting of the entries of K. By
the `1 norm relaxation, the objective function ‖K‖0 is
relaxed by ‖vec(K)‖1.
The constraint rank(D¯(z) + FK) < ρ is a rank con-
straint. In general, rank constraint/minimization prob-
lems is hard to solve, both in theory and practice. A par-
ticularly interesting method is the nuclear norm heuris-
tic. In particular, (Fazel et al., 2004) showed that the
convex envelop of the function rank(M) on the set {M ∈
Rm×n|‖M‖2 ≤ 1} is ‖M‖∗. In addition, (Recht et al.,
2010) showed that, under certain conditions, e.g., RIP,
the relaxation via the nuclear norm heuristic can re-
turn minimum-rank solutions. By the nuclear norm re-
laxation, the rank constraint of problem (10) is relaxed
by minz∈C,K∈R(p+l)×(n+p) ‖D¯(z)+FK‖∗. Notice that this
relaxation turns the hard rank constraint into a soft con-
straint in the objective function.
The determinant function in the second constraint of
problem (10) is a polynomial of the entries of KSS and
KSI and is non-convex. To relax this controllability con-
straint, we first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Assume that (A¯, B¯) is controllable. Then
(Aˆ, Bˆ) is controllable if and only if vB¯KSI 6= −vB¯ for
any left eigenvector v of A¯+ B¯KSS. •
Proof: By Theorem 6.1 of (Chen, 1999), the perturbed
system (A¯+ B¯KSS , B¯(Ip +KSI)) is controllable if and
only if [A¯ + B¯KSS − λIn, B¯(Ip + KSI)] has full row
rank at every eigenvalue λ of A¯ + B¯KSS , or, equiva-
lently, v[A¯+ B¯KSS − λIn, B¯(Ip +KSI)] 6= 01×(n+p) for
any v ∈ C1×n and v 6= 01×n at every eigenvalue λ of
A¯ + B¯KSS . Since A¯ + B¯KSS is real and λ is an eigen-
value of A¯ + B¯KSS , the latter condition above is then
equivalent to the condition that for each eigenvalue λ of
A¯+B¯KSS , v[A¯+B¯KSS−λIn, B¯(Ip+KSI)] 6= 01×(n+p)
for any left eigenvector v of A¯ + B¯KSS correspond-
ing to λ, i.e., v(A¯ + B¯KSS) = λv, for otherwise, if
v is not a left eigenvector of A¯ + B¯KSS correspond-
ing to λ, then v(A¯ + B¯KSS − λIn) 6= 01×n and surely
v[A¯+ B¯KSS − λIn, B¯(Ip +KSI)] 6= 01×(n+p). For each
eigenvalue λ of A¯+ B¯KSS , the condition v[A¯+ B¯KSS −
λIn, B¯(Ip + KSI)] 6= 01×(n+p) for any left eigenvec-
tor v of A¯ + B¯KSS corresponding to λ is equivalent
to vB¯(Ip + KSI) 6= 01×p, and further equivalent to
vB¯KSI 6= −vB¯ for any left eigenvector v of A¯ + B¯KSS
corresponding to λ. Since this needs to hold for every
eigenvalue λ of A¯ + B¯KSS , we have that (Aˆ, Bˆ) is con-
trollable if and only if vB¯KSI 6= −vB¯ for any left eigen-
vector v of A¯+ B¯KSS . •
Corollary 4.1 states that the invertibility of Ip +KSI is
a sufficient condition for the controllability of (Aˆ, Bˆ).
Corollary 4.1 Assume that (A¯, B¯) is controllable. If
Ip +KSI is invertible, then (Aˆ, Bˆ) is controllable. •
Proof: Since (A¯, B¯) is controllable, by Theorem 8.M1
of (Chen, 1999), (A¯ + B¯KSS , B¯) is controllable. Thus,
[A¯+B¯KSS−λIn, B¯] has full row rank at every eigenvalue
λ of A¯+B¯KSS . So vB¯ 6= 01×p for any left eigenvector v of
A¯+B¯KSS . Hence, if Ip+KSI is invertible, then vB¯(Ip+
KSI) 6= 01×p for any left eigenvector v of A¯+ B¯KSS . By
Lemma 4.1, we have that (Aˆ, Bˆ) is controllable. •
The invertibility of Ip + KSI is equivalent to that its
determinant is non-zero. However, the determinant of
Ip+KSI is a polynomial of the entries ofKSI and is non-
convex. We further relax the invertibility of Ip+KSI by
the condition that KSI is symmetric and Ip +KSI  0.
The strict positive definite condition is usually difficult
to deal with and may lead to infeasibility of the problem.
We relax this by a semidefinite condition as Ip +KSI −
εIp  0, where ε > 0 is a tuning parameter. It is clear
that if (1− ε)Ip +KSI  0, then Ip +KSI is invertible.
9
With the above relaxations, P˜0 is approximated by:
min
z∈C,K∈R(p+l)×(n+p),KSI∈Sp
‖vec(K)‖1 + c‖D¯(z) + FK‖∗
s.t. (1− ε)Ip +KSI  0. (14)
Remark 4.1 In problem (14), c > 0 plays the role of
Lagrangian multiplier, and tunes the relative weights be-
tween ‖vec(K)‖1 and ‖D¯(z) + FK‖∗. •
With the linear program (LP) characterization of `1
norm given in page 294 of (Boyd and Vandenberghe,
2004), minK∈R(p+l)×(n+p) ‖vec(K)‖1 can be cast as:
minK∈R(p+l)×(n+p),t∈Rm
∑m
`=1 t`, s.t. − t ≤ vec(K) ≤ t.
With the semidefinite program (SDP) characteriza-
tion of nuclear norm given by (Recht et al., 2010),
minz∈C,K∈R(p+l)×(n+p) c‖D¯(z) + FK‖∗ can be cast as:
min
z∈C,K∈R(p+l)×(n+p),W1∈Sn+l,W2∈Sn+p
c(Tr(W1) + Tr(W2))
s.t.
[
W1 D¯(z) + FK
(D¯(z) + FK)T W2
]
 0.
With the above LP and SDP characterizations, problem
(14) can be equivalently turned into an SDP as follows:
min
z∈C,K∈R(p+l)×(n+p),t∈Rm
KSI∈Sp,W1∈Sn+l,W2∈Sn+p
∑m
`=1
t` + c(Tr(W1) + Tr(W2))
s.t. − t ≤ vec(K) ≤ t, (1− ε)Ip +KSI  0[
W1 D¯(z) + FK
(D¯(z) + FK)T W2
]
 0. (15)
We have relaxed P˜0 into the SDP (15). There are several
types of efficient algorithms for solving SDPs, e.g., inte-
rior point methods and bundle method (Vandenberghe
and Boyd, 1996). These methods are implemented in
commercial solvers such as Mosek, SeDuMi, and CVX,
and can output the value of the SDP up to an additive
error  in time that is polynomial in the program de-
scription size and log 1/.
5 Problem P˜2
In the last section, we provide an SDP relaxation for
problem P˜0. This approach can be applied to problem
P˜2 by replacing the `1 norm heuristic by the SDP char-
acterization of `2 norm (page 170 of (Boyd and Vanden-
berghe, 2004)) in (15) and the resulting problem is:
min
z∈C,K∈R(p+l)×(n+p),t∈R
KSI∈Sp,W1∈Sn+l,W2∈Sn+p
t+ c(Tr(W1) + Tr(W2))
s.t.
[
tIp+l [H¯,Π]K
KT [H¯,Π]T tIn+p
]
 0, (1− ε)Ip +KSI  0
[
W1 D¯(z) + FK
(D¯(z) + FK)T W2
]
 0. (16)
For problem (16), c can only be tuned empirically. It
is challenging to estimate the total time one needs to
tune c a priori. For each given c, one needs to numer-
ically solve the SDP of problem (16). In this section,
we study an approach which can analytically construct
a feasible perturbation matrix K that satisfies the con-
straint rank(D¯(z) + FK) < ρ for a subclass of P˜2. This
approach is more systematic as one can determine the
largest possible tuning time of ρ a priori. Moreover, this
approach is computationally more efficient than numer-
ically solving the SDP of problem (16). In particular, in
this section, we consider the following subclass of prob-
lem (10) where the controllability constraint is dropped:
minK∈R(p+l)×(n+p),z∈C
∥∥[H¯,Π]K∥∥
2
s.t. rank(D¯(z) + FK) < ρ. (17)
Remark 5.1 We next identify a class of problems where
the perturbations do not affect system controllability so
that problem (17) can be applied. We rewrite system (2)
and (4) in the following form: x(k + 1) = A¯x(k) +
B¯eue(k) + B¯cuc(k) and y(k) = G¯x(k) + H¯eue(k) +
H¯cuc(k), where uc is the control input while ue is some
exogenous signal which is not used to control the sys-
tem. Hence, we only need the system to be controllable
with respect to uc, rather than ue. Assume that the tar-
get entries only include the entries of ue but do not in-
clude any entry of uc. In this case, to protect privacy,
we only need to perturb (A¯, B¯e, G¯, H¯e), but do not need
to perturb (B¯c, H¯c). Assume that B¯c has full row rank.
Then, for any perturbed matrix Aˆ, the controllability ma-
trix with respect to uc, [B¯c, AˆB¯c, · · · , Aˆn−1B¯c], always
has full row rank, which implies that the perturbed sys-
tem is always controllable with respect to uc. Hence, for
the above scenario, the perturbations do not affect sys-
tem controllability with respect to the control inputs and
problem (17) can be applied. An example of the above
scenario is the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
(HVAC) system in Section 6. •
In this section, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 5.1 D¯(z) has full row rank ∀z ∈ C. •
Remark 5.2 Assumption 5.1 implies q ≤ p and
D¯(z)D¯(z)† = In+q. Assumption 5.1 can be efficiently
checked as follows. Let rD¯ = maxz∈C rank(D¯(z)). For
any z′ ∈ C, if rank(D¯(z′)) < rD¯, then z′ is called an
invariant zero of D¯. Assumption 5.1 is equivalent to
that rD¯ = n+ q and D¯ does not have an invariant zero.
Given (A¯, B¯, G¯, H¯), to check whether Assumption 5.1
holds, one can first check whether D¯ has an invariant
zero. There are efficient algorithms to compute invari-
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ant zeros (Emami-Naeini and Van Dooren, 1982) 2 . If
D¯ does not have an invariant zero, then one can derive
the value of rD¯ by computing rD¯ = rank(D¯(z)) with any
z ∈ C and then check whether rD¯ = n+ q.
A sufficient condition for Assumption 5.1 is that q = p
and system (A¯, B¯, G¯, H¯) is strongly observable. By Theo-
rem 3 and Corollary 4 of (Yong et al., 2016), (A¯, B¯, G¯, H¯)
is strongly observable if and only if rank(D¯(z)) = n + p
for all z ∈ C. Hence, if q = p and (A¯, B¯, G¯, H¯) is strongly
observable, we have rank(D¯(z)) = n+ p = n+ q for all
z ∈ C and thus Assumption 5.1 holds. •
5.1 Feasible solution for fixed z
To solve problem (17), we first fix any z ∈ C and consider
the following problem P˜2(z):
minK∈R(p+l)×(n+p)
∥∥[H¯,Π]K∥∥
2
s.t. rank(D¯(z) + FK) < ρ. (18)
We aim to find a feasible solution for problem (18) and
derive an upper bound of the optimal value of problem
(18). To do this, we perform the singular value decompo-
sition (SVD) on D¯(z)†F as D¯(z)†F = U(z)Σ(z)V (z)T .
Since D¯(z) is assumed to have full row rank, we have
rank(D¯(z)†F ) = rank(F ). For any integer ` such that
1 ≤ ` ≤ min{n+ p, p+ l}, let σ`(z) be the `-th diagonal
entry of Σ(z). Without loss of generality, assume that the
σ`(z)’s are arranged in the descending order, i.e., σ1(z) ≥
σ2(z) ≥ · · · ≥ σrank(F )(z) > 0 and σrank(F )+1(z) =
σrank(F )+2(z) = · · · = σmin{n+p,p+l}(z) = 0. For any
integer ` such that 1 ≤ ` ≤ n + p, let u`(z) be the `-
th column vector of U(z). For any integer ` such that
1 ≤ ` ≤ p+l, let v`(z) be the `-th column vector of V (z).
We then have D¯(z)†F =
∑rank(F )
`=1 σ`(z)u`(z)v`(z)
T .
Lemma 5.1 Suppose that Assumption 5.1 holds. Fix
any z ∈ C. The following statements hold:
(i) Problem (18) is feasible if and only if ρ ≥ n + q −
rank(F ) + 1.
(ii) If ρ > n + q, then K˜ = 0(p+l)×(n+p) is an optimal
solution of problem (18) and the optimal value of prob-
lem (18) is zero.
(iii) If n + q − rank(F ) + 1 ≤ ρ ≤ n + q, then K˜(z) =
−∑n+q−ρ+1`=1 1σ`(z)v`(z)u`(z)T is a feasible solution of
problem (18) and the optimal value of problem (18) is
upper bounded by ‖[H¯,Π]‖2‖(D¯(z)†F )†‖∗. •
Proof: We first prove (i). Given any matrix M , de-
note by N (M) the right null space of M and denote by
|N (M)| the dimension of N (M). First, we show that
2 The algorithm of (Emami-Naeini and Van Dooren, 1982)
for finding the invariant zeros of a linear system has been
implemented in Matlab by the command tzero.
problem (18) is infeasible if ρ < n + q − rank(F ) + 1.
We show this by contradiction. Given any ρ < n + q −
rank(F )+1. Assume that there exists some K such that
rank(D¯(z) + FK) < ρ. This implies
|N (D¯(z) + FK)| > p− q + rank(F ). (19)
Let u be any right null vector of D¯(z) + FK, i.e.,
(D¯(z) + FK)u = 0n+q. We then have D¯(z)u = −FKu.
There can only be two cases: (a) D¯(z)u = −FKu =
0n+q and (b) D¯(z)u = −FKu 6= 0n+q. For case
(a), D¯(z)u = 0n+q implies that u ∈ N (D¯(z)).
By Assumption 5.1, rank(D¯(z)) = n + q. Hence,
|N (D¯(z))| = n+p−rank(D¯(z)) = n+p−(n+q) = p−q.
Thus, the dimension of the space of u for case (a) is
p − q. For case (b), −FKu 6= 0n+q implies that u is in
the complementary space of N (D¯(z) + FK) and thus
the dimension of the space of u in this case equals to
rank(FK) ≤ rank(F ). Combining the two cases (a) and
(b), we reach that |N (D¯(z) + FK)| ≤ p− q + rank(F ),
which contradicts (19). Hence, problem (18) is infeasible
if ρ < n+ q − rank(F ) + 1.
We next show that problem (18) is feasible if ρ ≥ n +
q − rank(F ) + 1. This is proven by proving (ii) and
(iii). We first prove (ii). Since rank(D¯(z)) = n + q,
rank(D¯(z)) < ρ. It is clear that K˜ = 0(p+l)×(n+p) is a
feasible solution for problem (18). Since ‖[H¯,Π]K‖2 ≥ 0
and ‖[H¯,Π]K˜‖2 = 0 with K˜ = 0(p+l)×(n+p), we have
that K˜ = 0(p+l)×(n+p) is an optimal solution for prob-
lem (18) and the optimal value of problem (18) is zero.
We next prove (iii). Substituting K˜(z) = −∑n+q−ρ+1`=1
1
σ`(z)
v`(z)u`(z)
T into D¯(z) + FK yields:
D¯(z) + FK˜(z) = D¯(z)(In+p + D¯(z)
†FK˜(z))
= D¯(z)(In+p −
n+q−ρ+1∑
`=1
1
σ`(z)
D¯(z)†Fv`(z)u`(z)T )
= D¯(z)(In+p −
∑n+q−ρ+1
`=1
u`(z)u`(z)
T )
= D¯(z)(
n+p∑
`=1
u`(z)u`(z)
T −
n+q−ρ+1∑
`=1
u`(z)u`(z)
T )
= D¯(z)
∑n+p
`=n+q−ρ+2 u`(z)u`(z)
T . (20)
In (20), the first equation is a result of Assumption 5.1;
the fourth equation is due to D¯(z)†Fv`(z) = σ`(z)u`(z)
for all ` ∈ [1, rank(F )]; and the fifth equation is because
U(z) is unitary, i.e., U(z)U(z)T =
∑n+p
`=1 u`(z)u`(z)
T =
In+p. Since U(z) is unitary, u`(z)
Tu`′(z) = 0 for
all `, `′ ∈ [1, n + p] and ` 6= `′. By (20), for all
`′ ∈ [1, n+ q − ρ+ 1], we have
(D¯(z) + FK˜(z))u`′(z)
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= D¯(z)
∑n+p
`=n+q−ρ+2 u`(z)u`(z)
Tu`′(z) = 0n+q.
As rank(D¯(z)) = n + q ≤ n + p and U(z) is uni-
tary, there must be exactly p − q column vectors
of U(z) which are right null vectors of D¯(z). Let
u`′(z) be any such vector, i.e., u`′(z) is a column vec-
tor of U(z) and D¯(z)u`′(z) = 0n+q. We show that
`′ ≥ rank(F ) + 1, i.e., u`′(z) corresponds to a zero
singular value of D¯(z)†F . As D¯(z)u`′(z) = 0n+q,
u`′(z)
T D¯(z)T = 01×(n+q). So u`′(z)T D¯(z)† = 01×(n+q).
Hence, u`′(z)
T D¯(z)†F = σ`′(z)v`′(z)T = 01×(p+l).
Thus σ`′(z) = 0 and `
′ ∈ [rank(F ) + 1, n + p]. As
ρ ≥ n+ q − rank(F ) + 1, rank(F ) + 1 ≥ n+ q − ρ+ 2.
By (20), we have
(D¯(z) + FK˜(z))u`′(z) = D¯(z)
∑n+p
`=n+q−ρ+2 u`(z)
· u`(z)Tu`′(z) = D¯(z)u`′(z) = 0n+q.
We have found (n + q − ρ + 1) + (p − q) = n +
p − ρ + 1 linearly independent right null vectors of
D¯(z) + FK˜. Hence, rank(D¯(z) + FK˜) < ρ and K˜(z)
= −∑n+q−ρ+1`=1 1σ`(z)v`(z)u`(z)T is a feasible solution of
problem (18). Since ρ ≥ n + q − rank(F ) + 1, we have
rank(F ) ≥ n+q−ρ+1. Hence, for the constructed K˜(z),
the value of the objective function of problem (18) is
‖[H¯,Π]K˜(z)‖2 = ‖
∑n+q−ρ+1
`=1
[H¯,Π]
σ`(z)
v`(z)u`(z)
T ‖2
≤
∑rank(F )
`=1
‖[H¯,Π]‖2
σ`(z)
‖v`(z)u`(z)T ‖2
=
∑rank(F )
`=1
‖[H¯,Π]‖2
σ`(z)
= ‖[H¯,Π]‖2‖(D(z)†F )†‖∗. (21)
Hence, ‖[H¯,Π]‖2‖(D¯(z)†F )†‖∗ is an upper bound of the
optimal value of problem (18). •
Remark 5.3 The derivation of (21) utilizes the prop-
erty ‖v`(z)u`(z)T ‖2 = 1. This property in general does
not hold for `0 norm or `1 norm, i.e., ‖v`(z)u`(z)T ‖0 6= 1
and ‖v`(z)u`(z)T ‖1 6= 1. Thus, the approach developed
in this section is not suitable for problem P˜0. •
5.2 Minimization over z
To compute the feasible perturbation matrix by Lemma
5.1, we first need to decide the value of z. By Lemma 5.1,
‖[H¯,Π]‖2‖(D¯(z)†F )†‖∗ is an upper bound of the optimal
value of problem (18). Since ‖[H¯,Π]‖2 is a constant, we
aim to minimize ‖(D¯(z)†F )†‖∗ over z ∈ C. Notice that
D¯(z) is a symbolic matrix and computing the pseudo
inverse of a symbolic matrix could be time-consuming.
To avoid it, we perform the following relaxation.
We perform SVD as F = UFΣFVF . Let r = rank(F )
and ΣF =
[
Σ˜F 0r×(p+l−r)
0(n+q−r)×r 0(n+q−r)×(p+l−r)
]
, where
Σ˜F is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries
are the r non-zero singular values of F . Let UF =
[UF1, UF2] and VF = [VF1, VF2], with UF1 ∈ R(n+q)×r,
UF2 ∈ R(n+q)×(n+q−r), VF1 ∈ R(p+l)×r and VF2 ∈
R(p+l)×(p+l−r). The SVD of F is then F =
[
UF1 UF2
]
[
Σ˜F 0r×(p+l−r)
0(n+q−r)×r 0(n+q−r)×(p+l−r)
][
V TF1
V TF2
]
= UF1Σ˜FV
T
F1.
Since D¯(z)†UF1 has full column rank and Σ˜FV TF1 has
full row rank, by Corollary 1.4.2 of (Campbell and
Meyer, 2009), (D¯(z)†F )† = (D¯(z)†UF1Σ˜FV TF1)
† =
(Σ˜FV
T
F1)
†(D¯(z)†UF1)†. By the definitions of matrix `2
norm and nuclear norm (Horn and Johnson, 1985), we
have ‖M‖∗ ≤ rM‖M‖2 for any matrix M with rank rM .
It follows that
‖(D¯(z)†F )†‖∗ ≤ r‖(D¯(z)†F )†‖2
≤ r‖(Σ˜FV TF1)†‖2‖(D¯(z)†UF1)†‖2. (22)
Since D¯(z)† has full column rank and UF is unitary, by
Ex. 2 in page 80 of (Ipsen, 2009), σmin(D¯(z)
†UF1) ≥
σmin(D¯(z)
†UF ). Since ‖(D¯(z)†UF1)†‖2 = 1σmin(D¯(z)†UF1)
and ‖(D¯(z)†UF )†‖2 = 1σmin(D¯(z)†UF ) , we then have
‖(D¯(z)†UF1)†‖2 ≤ ‖(D¯(z)†UF )†‖2. By (22), we have
‖(D¯(z)†F )†‖∗ ≤ r‖(Σ˜FV TF1)†‖2‖(D¯(z)†UF )†‖2
= r‖(Σ˜FV TF1)†‖2‖UTF D¯(z)‖2 = r‖(Σ˜FV TF1)†‖2‖D¯(z)‖2
≤ r‖(Σ˜FV TF1)†‖2‖D¯(z)‖F .
The first equality is because D¯(z)† has full column rank
and UF has full row rank (see Corollary 1.4.2 in page
22 of (Campbell and Meyer, 2009)); the second equal-
ity holds because UF is a unitary matrix; and the last
inequality is due to the equivalence of matrix norms
(Horn and Johnson, 1985), i.e., ‖M‖2 ≤ ‖M‖F for any
matrix M . Notice that r‖(Σ˜FV TF1)†‖2 is independent of
z. Hence, we are to minimize ‖D¯(z)‖F or equivalently
‖D¯(z)‖2F over z ∈ C. We have
‖D¯(z)‖2F = Tr(D¯(z)T D¯(z)) = Tr(z2In − (A¯+ A¯T )z)
+ Tr(A¯T A¯+ G¯T G¯) + Tr(B¯T B¯ + H¯T H¯).
Since Tr(A¯T A¯+G¯T G¯)+Tr(B¯T B¯+H¯T H¯) is constant, we
are to minimize Tr(z2In− (A¯+ A¯T )z) = nz2−2Tr(A¯)z.
Hence, the optimal value of z is z˜ = Tr(A¯)/n.
5.3 Overall approach
Given ρ ≥ n+ q − rank(F ) + 1, we have derived a pro-
cedure to determine a feasible solution of problem (17)
which minimizes an upper bound of the optimal value of
(17). The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, we aim to protect all the
target entries with the largest possible ρ. The tuning of ρ
can be systematically performed as follows. By Assump-
tion 5.1, we have rank(D¯(z)+FK) ≤ min{n+q, n+p} =
n + q. Hence, we can start with the maximum number
ρ = n + q and run Algorithm 1. After that, we use the
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for finding a suboptimal feasi-
ble solution of problem (17)
Compute z˜ = Tr(A¯)/n;
Perform SVD: D¯(z˜)†F =
∑rank(F )
`=1 σ`(z˜)u`(z˜)v`(z˜)
T ;
Compute K˜ by (ii) or (iii) of Lemma 5.1:
if ρ > n+ q, K˜ = 0(p+l)×(n+p);
if ρ ≤ n+ q, K˜ = −∑n+q−ρ+1`=1 1σ`(z˜)v`(z˜)u`(z˜)T .
Table 1
Parameters/variables of the HVAC system
Li thermal capacity of zone Zi
Rji thermal conductance between zone Zi and zone Zj
∆t discretization stepsize
co thermal load per occupant
T si temperature of air supplied to zone Zi
Ti temperature of zone Zi
msi mass flow rate of air supplied to zone Zi
cp thermal capacity of air
Vi number of occupants of zone Zi
mechanism introduced at the second last paragraph of
Section 3.2 to check whether all the target entries are
protected. If not, we decrease ρ by one and re-run Al-
gorithm 1. The procedure is repeated until all the tar-
get entries are protected or ρ = 1. Hence, ρ needs to be
tuned for at most n + q times. For each given ρ, most
computational effort of Algorithm 1 is spent to perform
the SVD operation, which is computationally more effi-
cient than numerically solving the SDP of problem (16).
6 Case study
In this section, we validate the efficacy of the developed
techniques by an HVAC system.
6.1 System model
Consider a set of N building zones Z = {Z1, · · · ,ZN}.
The physical meanings of the system parameters and
variables are listed in Table 1. For each i ∈ {1, · · · , N},
the following discrete-time dynamic model of zone Zi is
adopted from (Kelman and Borrelli, 2011):
(Li/∆t+
∑
j∈Ni
Rji/2 +m
s
i (k)cp/2)Ti(k + 1)
= (Li/∆t−
∑
j∈Ni
Rji/2−msi (k)cp/2)Ti(k)
+
∑
j∈Ni
RjiTj(k) +m
s
i (k)cpT
s
i (k) + coVi(k). (23)
Assume that msi is constant, i.e., m
s
i (k) ≡ m¯si for all
i’s. The state and the control input of each zone Zi
is Ti and T
s
i , respectively. For each i ∈ {1, · · · , N},
let xi(k) = Ti(k), u
e
i (k) = Vi(k) and u
c
i (k) = T
s
i (k).
System (23) can then be written as xi(k + 1) =
A¯iixi(k) +
∑
j∈Ni A¯ijxj(k) + B¯
e
i u
e
i (k) + B¯
c
i u
c
i (k), where
A¯ii =
Li/∆t−m¯si cp/2−1/2
∑
j∈Ni
Rji
Li/∆t+m¯si cp/2+1/2
∑
j∈Ni
Rji
,
A¯ij =
Rji
Li/∆t+m¯si cp/2+1/2
∑
j∈Ni
Rji
, ∀j ∈ Ni,
B¯ei =
co
Li/∆t+m¯si cp/2+1/2
∑
j∈Ni
Rji
,
B¯ci =
msi cp
Li/∆t+m¯si cp/2+1/2
∑
j∈Ni
Rji
. The outputs re-
quired by the data requester are given by y(k) =
G¯x(k) + H¯eue(k) + H¯cuc(k) and the data requester
knows (A¯, B¯e, B¯c, G¯, H¯e, H¯c). The above state and out-
put equations can be written in the form of (2) and (4)
with u = [ueT , ucT ]T , B¯ = [B¯e, B¯c] and H¯ = [H¯e, H¯c].
6.2 Privacy issue
The usage of occupancy data poses risks on the privacy
of individual occupants. It has been shown in (Wang and
Tague, 2014) that with some auxiliary information such
as an office directory, individual location traces can be
inferred from the occupancy data with accuracy of more
than 90%. The information attached to location traces
could reveal much about the individual occupants’ inter-
ests, activities and relationships (Lisovich et al., 2010).
In system (23), the individual location trace is the pri-
vate information. As mentioned above, this informa-
tion could potentially be inferred from the occupancy
data Vi’s. We aim to use the proposed intentional input-
output perturbations to perturb system (23) so that the
perturbed system is private in the sense of Definition 2.1.
6.3 Applicability of the developed techniques
Problem P˜0: In the above HVAC system, uc is the control
while ue is an exogenous signal which is not used to con-
trol the system. Hence, when we formulate problem (10),
we should only maintain controllability with respect to
uc, but not ue. This is embedded into problem (10) by
replacing the input matrix B¯ in the controllability con-
straint by the partial input matrix B¯c associated with
uc. One can then apply the relaxation techniques pro-
posed in Section 4. The simulation results for problem
P˜0 in this section are derived for the modified problem.
Problem P˜2: Notice that the target entries only include
entries of ue, but no entry of uc. Moreover, in our prob-
lem, B¯c has full row rank (the parameters of B¯c are
adopted from (Ma et al., 2011)). As mentioned in Re-
mark 5.1, to protect privacy, we only need to perturb
(A¯, B¯e, G¯, H¯e), but do not need to perturb (B¯c, H¯c), and
it is guaranteed that the perturbed system is controllable
with respect to uc. Hence, problem (17) can be applied.
In the following simulation for P˜2, the matrices D¯(z) and
F in problem (17) are defined by (A¯, B¯e, G¯, H¯e). For the
simulation for problem P˜0, in order to verify the relax-
ation for the controllability constraint (the constraint
of problem (14)) proposed in Section 4, we perturb the
overall matrices (A¯, B¯, G¯, H¯) where B¯ = [B¯e, B¯c] and
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Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 9 Zone 10…...
Fig. 1. Floor plan for the HVAC system
Table 2
Effect of c with ε ≡ 0.1 for problem P˜0
c 0.5 0.8 1.0 2.0 3.0
Controllability Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
rank(D¯(z˜) + FK˜) 30 27 23 22 17
‖K˜‖0 28 72 93 300 492
H¯ = [H¯e, H¯c]. Accordingly, the matrices D¯(z) and F in
problem (15) are defined by (A¯, B¯, G¯, H¯).
6.4 Simulation results
We take N = 10, which leads to n = 10 and pe = pc =
10, where pe and pc are the dimensions of ue and uc, re-
spectively. We choose qe = qc = 10, where qe and qc are
the row numbers of H¯e and H¯c, respectively. The undi-
rected graph describing the topology of the zone network
is denoted by G = (V, E), where V = {Z1, · · · ,Z10} and
E = {(Z1,Z2), · · · , (Z9,Z10)}. The floor plan is depicted
by Fig. 1. This adjacency topology is widely used in the
literature, e.g., (Ma et al., 2011). The values of the pa-
rameters in Table 1 are adopted from (Ma et al., 2011).
Problem P˜0. The matrices G¯ and H¯ are randomly gen-
erated. We first fix ε ≡ 0.1 and test the performance
with different c. From Table 2, we can see that when
c is too small, the perturbed system does not lose a
rank. As c increases, the perturbed system has less and
less ranks. Row 5 shows that as c increases, the value
of ‖K˜‖0 increases. Fig. 2 shows that after c passing
the threshold, rank(D¯(z˜) + FK˜) has a fast decreasing
period (resp. ‖K˜‖0 has a fast increasing period) as c
keeps increasing, and after c is larger than another value,
rank(D¯(z˜)+FK˜) decreases (resp. ‖K˜‖0 increases) much
slower and tends to constant. Given a perturbed sys-
tem derived under a specific c, we use the mechanism
introduced at the second last paragraph of Section 3.2
to check which data items can be inferred and which
cannot. When c = 1, (T1(0), T7(0), T8(0), T9(0), V6) can
be inferred; when c = 1.2, only (T8(0), T9(0)) can be in-
ferred; when c ≥ 1.5, no entry can be inferred.
We next verify that the positive semidefinite condition
with the introduction of ε in (15) can guarantee control-
lability of the perturbed system. We fix c ≡ 2 and test
the cases ε = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.50, 1.00, 5.00. The per-
turbed system is controllable for all the tested values.
Table 3
Method of Section 5 for problem P˜2
ρ 21 16 9 7 5 3
rank(D¯(z˜) + FK˜) 20 15 8 6 4 2
‖[H¯,Π]K˜‖2 0 0.48 1.15 1.23 1.40 1.58
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Fig. 2. Effect of c with ε ≡ 0.1 for problem P˜0
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Fig. 4. Data disutility of problem P˜2
Problem P˜2. In this case, G¯ and H¯e are randomly gen-
erated such that Assumption 5.1 holds. We then ap-
ply Algorithm 1. In the simulation, we have n = 10,
qe = 10, rank(F ) = 20 and Tr(A¯) = 10. Hence, we
have z˜ = Tr(A¯)/n = 1. Table 3 and Fig. 3 show that
rank(D¯(z˜) + FK˜) = ρ − 1 < ρ for each ρ. This veri-
fies that the construction of K given by Lemma 5.1 is
feasible for problem (18). Table 3 and Fig. 3 also show
that the smaller the value of ρ, the larger the value of
‖[H¯,Π]K˜‖2. Given a perturbed system derived under a
specific ρ, we use the mechanism introduced at the sec-
ond last paragraph of Section 3.2 to check which data
items can be inferred and which cannot. When ρ = 21,
(T10(0), V3, V8) can be inferred; when ρ = 19, only V8
can be inferred; when ρ ≤ 18, for any i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 10},
no entry can be inferred. We then design a state feed-
back controller uc such that each xi is stabilized at 21.5
degrees. In the control problem, each Vi is viewed as an
external noise and is generated as a random integer be-
tween 0 to 10 at each iteration. The data disutility of
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problem P˜2 is shown in Fig. 4, in which ytrue is the unper-
turbed output and yIOP is the perturbed output (IOP
indicates input-output perturbations). We can see that
the data disutility ‖yIOP(k)− ytrue(k)‖2 is below 10% of
‖ytrue(k)‖2 after 5 iterations.
We also simulate the differentially private scheme in the
paper (Le Ny and Pappas, 2014) with ε = 0.1 (i.e., 0.1-
differential privacy) on the HVAC problem. Fig. 5 shows
the comparison with our algorithm for problem P˜2 in
terms of data utility. In Fig. 5, ytrue and yIOP have the
same meanings as those in Fig. 4, and yDP is the per-
turbed output by (Le Ny and Pappas, 2014)’s scheme
(DP indicates differential privacy). The first row shows
data disutility of our method and the second row shows
that of the paper (Le Ny and Pappas, 2014). From Fig.
5, we can see that our method achieves much better data
utility than the differential privacy method of the paper
(Le Ny and Pappas, 2014) when ε = 0.1.
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Fig. 5. Comparison with differential privacy for problem P˜2
We also simulate the SDP approach (16) with the last
constraint dropped. The average time of solving the SDP
of (16) once is 8.18 seconds, while the average time of
running Algorithm 1 once is 0.0048 seconds. As men-
tioned in the paragraph right below (16), one only needs
to tune ρ for at most min{n+q, n+p} times. For this ex-
ample, min{n+q, n+p} = 20. Hence, for the worst case,
one needs to run Algorithm 1 twenty times and the total
running time is approximately 0.0048× 20 = 0.096 sec-
onds, which is still much shorter than solving the SDP
of (16) once. This verifies that Algorithm 1 is computa-
tionally more efficient than the SDP approach.
7 Conclusions
This paper formulates the problem of perturbation de-
sign to achieve privacy-preserving data release of linear
dynamic networks. The computational complexity of the
formulated optimization problem is analyzed. An SDP
relaxation for the `0 minimization is derived. For a class
of `2 minimizations, we provide a computationally more
efficient method which can return an analytic feasible
solution. A case study on an HVAC system is conducted
to validate the efficacy of the developed techniques.
8 Appendix
In this section, we first provide an introduction to
`-diversity. After that, we illustrate how to extend `-
diversity to construct Definition 2.1 in our problem
setting.
Table 4
A 3-diverse salary/disease table
ZIP code Age Salary Disease
476** 2* 3K gastric ulcer
476** 2* 4K gastritis
476** 2* 5K stomach cancer
4790* ≥ 40 6K gastritis
4790* ≥ 40 11K flu
4790* ≥ 40 8K brochitis
476** 3* 7K bronchitis
476** 3* 9K pneumonia
476** 3* 10K stomach cancer
Informally speaking, the notion of `-diversity requires
that, given the adversary’s observations, there is ade-
quate diversity in each sensitive attribute of the dataset
in the released table. The work Li et al. (2007) formally
defines `-diversity as that each equivalence class of the
released table has at least ` “well-represented” values
for each sensitive attribute. An equivalence class of an
anonymized table is a set of records that share the val-
ues of the attributes the adversary may know. Having
` “well-represented” values essentially means that the
probabilities of these ` values are close to each other and
meanwhile the total probability of these ` values is sig-
nificant, e.g., equal or close to 1. We adopt the follow-
ing example from Li et al. (2007) to illustrate the no-
tion of `-diversity. Table 4 is an anonymized table with
four attributes, namely, ZIP code, Age, Salary and Dis-
ease, in which the adversary might observe ZIP codes
and Ages of some records, while Salary and Disease are
sensitive attributes which should not be disclosed to the
adversary. Each * represents an anonymized digit. Each
equivalence class shares the values of ZIP code and Age.
So there are three equivalence classes: rows 1–3, rows 4–
6 and rows 7–9. Since each equivalence class has three
different values for each of Salary and Disease, Table 4
has 3-diversity. Assume that the adversary knows that a
specific participant has ZIP code 47630 and age 33 and
aims to infer this participant’s salary and type of disease.
Through Table 4, the adversary can tell that this par-
ticipant’s record belongs to the equivalence class formed
by the last three rows. However, since this equivalence
class has 3-diversity, the adversary cannot uniquely de-
termine the participant’s salary or type of disease.
The notion of diversity can be interpreted as a measure
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Table 5
An illustrative example
y x1(0) x2(0)
2 1 1
2 2 0
2 0 2
...
...
...
3 1 2
3 2 1
3 3 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
of uncertainty: a larger diversity indicates that the un-
certainty on the sensitive attributes is also larger. In our
paper, to make an analogy between `-diversity and our
privacy notion Definition 2.1, we can use the output se-
quence {y(k)} as the label of an equivalence class and
view each of the adversarial data requester’s target en-
tries (i.e., xt(0) and ut) as a sensitive attribute. To fix
idea, we first provide an illustrative example. For sim-
plicity, let Aˆ, Bˆ and Hˆ all be zero matrices and Gˆ = [1, 1].
Then the system becomes the single constant output
equation y = x1(0) + x2(0), where x1(0) and x2(0) are
sensitive attributes and y is the data requester’s obser-
vation. The released table is in the form of Table 5. In
Table 5, each real number for y generates an equiva-
lence class and each equivalence class has infinite diver-
sity/uncertainty on both x1(0) and x2(0). Using the ob-
served output y, say y = 2, the data requester can de-
termine that x1(0) and x2(0) must take values in one
record of the equivalence class corresponding to y = 2.
Since x1(0) and x2(0) could be any point on the line
x1(0) + x2(0) = 2, the diversity/uncertainty on x1(0)
and x2(0) is infinite.
We next illustrate how to construct the released table for
the general case of our problem. The following notations
are consistent with those used in Section 2.3. Our hypo-
thetical released table has the form of Table 6. In Table
6, each equivalence class is a set of initial states and in-
puts which produce the same {y(k)}. To be more spe-
cific, each equivalence class labeled by a specific output
sequence y[0,κ] includes the target entries (x
t(0), ut[0,κ])
of ∆Aˆ,Bˆ,Gˆ,Hˆ(y[0,κ]), together with admissible non-target
entries (xn(0), un[0,κ]). Similar to `-diversity, our privacy
goal is to guarantee that each equivalence class has ade-
quate diversity/uncertainty on each of the target entries
(xt1(0), · · · , xtdtx(0), u
t
1, · · · , utdtu). In `-diversity, sensitive
attributes take discrete values and the diversity on each
sensitive attribute is defined by the number of different
valuations for that attribute in each equivalence class. In
contrast, the target entries xt(0) and ut in our paper are
continuous-valued and thus cannot be enumerated (i.e.,
uncountable). Hence, we need to introduce a new mea-
sure to quantify the diversity/uncertainty. In this paper,
we propose to measure the diversity/uncertainty by the
diameter of the set ∆Aˆ,Bˆ,Gˆ,Hˆ(y[0,κ]). For each target en-
try, a larger diameter indicates a larger range of admis-
sible valuations and thus a larger diversity/uncertainty.
An infinite diameter achieves the largest possible di-
versity/uncertainty. Hence, for our problem setting, we
say that privacy is preserved if the diameter of the set
∆Aˆ,Bˆ,Gˆ,Hˆ(y[0,κ]) is infinite for any feasible output se-
quence y[0,κ] for any κ ∈ N. Please refer to Section 2.3
for the detailed definitions and discussions.
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